

**U. S. GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM OF CALL**

Date

8 July 79

Time

TO—

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY—

☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Col Higgins, B-2

TELEPHONE:

Number or code

131

Extension

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

☐ PLEASE CALL

☐ WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN

☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

☐ RETURNING YOUR CALL

LEFT THIS MESSAGE: would like to know the

source of the second statement in Para.

54.

Received by—

INCOMING TELEGRAM**Department of State****85**~~SECRET~~16
Action
NEAControl: 15685
Rec'd: June 30, 1955
11:15 a.m.Info
RMR**FROM:** Karachi**TO:** Secretary of State**NO:** 2082, June 30, 3 p.m.Review of this document by CIA has
determined that☒ CIA has no objection to declass
it contains information of CIA
interest that must remain

classified at TS S C

Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interestDate 12 JUN 81 Reviewer 6514SS
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USIA For some months now we have conducted holding action here,
CIA trying to stem mounting tide of Pakistan dissatisfaction
OSD with slowness of progress in implementation MDAP. On basis our
ARMY understanding US commitment to Pakistanis, which agreed in all
NAVY respects with statement P.15 OCB outline plan of operations on
AIR NSC 5409, May 18, and delivery schedules furnished MAAG Pakistan
we were confident that program would shortly begin to move
convincingly. Strong and widespread as criticism was, we felt
it would evaporate and be forgotten as soon as equipment began
to arrive in significant quantities and reasonable progress in
implementation of program was registered.

DCL We are now seriously disturbed at indications of deliberate
FOA slow-down in whole program of deliveries. National intelligence
estimate number 52-55 dated March 15, 1955 stated (paragraph 54)
"it is estimated that the present MDA program for Pakistan Army
will take 5 years or more to complete..." Slow-down of FY
1954 deliveries reported DA983570 seems to indicate that program
now proceeding on this calendar.

We do not know what considerations of availability or policy
have prompted this apparent departure from commitment which US
Government saw fit to provide Pakistanis in writing in October
1954 that every effort would be made to attain program in less than
3 and 1/2 years originally planned, but we feel we must warn of
serious political consequences such decision will have in
addition to unfortunate military results described MAAG Pakistan
90701.

As Embassy has repeatedly pointed out, group who have held power
in Pakistan for past 2 years are more favorable to US and free
world interest than any possible alternative in sight. They
took Pakistan boldly into free world camp, and have cooperated
effectively with US in international sphere. They are publicly
identified with this policy, and their position in Pakistan
depends in considerable measure on its success.

Political

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SECRET

-2- 2082, June 30, 3 p.m., from Karachi

Political skirmishing prior to elections to new Constituent Assembly graphically demonstrated this proposition and importance it may have in future developments here. Most powerful organs opposed to ruling group singled out public disappointment over US performance under military and economic aid programs as their most vulnerable spot. Criticism of poor performance under these programs was sharp and fairly general through opposition press, and slanted more against government than against US. Some articles implied GOP had sold Pakistan for mess of porridge; others took line that US deliberately holding back because of dissatisfaction within stability of country's political situation and undemocratic character present government. Government felt necessary defend itself against these attacks, and statements were made by General Ayub, Minister of Defense, and Said Hasan, Secretary Economic Affairs, general tenor of both being that though programs had moved somewhat slowly so far, substantial deliveries would soon arrive.

Elections to Constituent Assembly have left ruling group in central position, with reasonable prospects of retaining power, though this will certainly be diluted by need to strike bargain with non-Muslim League elements and to broaden base of Cabinet. Their position by no means as strong as it was, and any vulnerabilities will be vigorously exploited by opposition.

Under these circumstances, we consider obvious slow-down in delivery schedule reported DA 983570, and protraction of total army program over 5 years or more as predicted NIE study bound to have unfortunate consequences. It is too early yet to assess long-term prospects following Assembly elections but it seems entirely possible that if these facts become generally known this might seriously impair ability of group to influence Assembly. At the least it is certain to be serious embarrassment to them and will probably disillusion them with US. If they ride out opposition attacks and retain control in spite of them, their disposition to cooperate with US will probably diminish considerably.

These developments appear particularly untimely at juncture when Ayub has just been persuaded to agree Pakistan adherence to Turk-Iraq-UK pact. As Washington well aware, he has been far from happy with program as described October aide-memoire. His reactions when informed that in recognition pact adherence US has decided stretch out program to 5 years or more will be difficult to cope with.

SW:LFS/6

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